The IPC does nothing about Offences – it will not listen, speak or take an interest, it is Deaf Dumb and Distant.
OPEN LETTER TO: Information Privacy Commissioner Registrar, Speaker of the Ontario Legislature, Ontario Internal Audit Division
This is an election year. The IPC has known for years that the Township of South Glengarry, refuses access to public records e.g. councillor’s expenses.
Public Interest, Debate, Rights
Can the Township of South Glengarry, refuse access to public records using MFIPPA procedures? Is this democracy?
It cannot be that the Legislature intended the IPC to ignore offenses, its duties, obligations, “Values” and “Goals”.
Does the IPC Ignore its Duty, Obligations?
The Township of South Glengarry maintains a secret Personal Information Bank, as they refuse access under S34 – is this an offence under S48(1) (b) & (c.1) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act?
The IPC has a duty to uphold MFIPPA, the rights of requestor’s and to report to the Legislature.
“The IPC is not involved in prosecuting an offence under the MFIPPA.” S. Brocklehurst, IPC Registrar
How can the IPC report offences, if the IPC ignores offenses?
The IPC states “The System is working but reform is desirable”
But The IPC published falsified annual reports! – while ignoring its own duties.
South Glengarry and the IPC failed to report my 2014-16 complaints, thereby falsifying those reports.
Will South Glengarry and the IPC fail to report 2017, 2018 offenses? To further mislead the public?
I respectfully ask the IPC Registrar, to not turn a blind eye, a deaf ear to offences.
I ask the Speaker of the Ontario Legislature to ensure the IPC complies with its duties and obligations.
I ask The Ontario Internal Audit Division ensure good faith compliance by the IPC.
All, please respond, at your earliest opportunity, in line with applicable policies.
Honorable MPPs please speak up for the rights of Ontarions – to hold the IPC accountable.
All Responses will be published. Thank you, in advance for your time and efforts.
The reasons of the Divisional Court herein, deserve the greatest respect and consideration.
In Ontario (Children’s Lawyer) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2003 CanLII 72347 (ON SCDC) the honorable O’Driscoll, Lane and Kozak JJ., expressed very much concern that FIPPA not be used, in place of common sense, goodwill and applicable legislation:
FIPPA and the Common Law
 We wish to make it clear that it puzzles, and very much concerns, the court that the request of Jane Doe for her legal file was diverted to the FIPPA stream for handling at all. It was surely a straightforward request by a client, now of age, for information as to her own case from her own lawyers. That kind of request is common in the practice of law and is governed, if not by the common sense and goodwill of the parties, then by the Solicitors Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Law Society. There seems to be no necessity to resort to FIPPA in such a case. Indeed, the reasons set out above illustrate that FIPPA is not designed to deal with such a request.
 In a recent case [Note 26], where CTV sought an order requiring the Toronto Police Service to permit it to copy court records in a criminal case, the Court of Appeal said, at paras. 28-29:
Finally, the Toronto Police Service argues that the existence of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56 precludes the court from exercising its common law jurisdiction to order access to court records. The respondent says that this legislation permits the appellant to apply for access to the exhibits it seeks and sets up criteria for evaluating such a request.
 In my view, the simple answer to this argument is that the regime set up under this legislation has an entirely different purpose. It is designed to regulate access to private information which, but for the regime, would not otherwise be available to the public. By contrast, the jurisdiction which the appellant seeks to engage is over court records which the common law treats as presumptively accessible to the public. There is nothing in the legislation that suggests either explicitly or by necessary implication that the court’s jurisdiction at common law is being curtailed or removed. This is hardly surprising since the legislation is designed for such a different purpose. The regime it establishes is simply one which co-exists with the court’s jurisdiction. It does not replace it.